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THE LAWYERS TASK OF SISYPHUS*
F. ANTHONY BREWSTER"*
The Law, wherein, as in a magic mirror, we see reflected not
our own lives, but the lives of all men that have been! When I
think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle.
Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr.
The practice of law has always demanded the highest and best efforts
of the lawyer. While Shakespeare waggishly proposed to solve man-
kind's troubles by ridding the world of lawyers, we have somehow man-
aged to survive the cure proposed by the "immortal bard" and flourish
as a noble profession especially equipped to deal with the trotbles of our
fellow men. This does not mean that the message in Shakespeare's
jest should fall on deaf ears. Shakespeare, we submit, really meant
that lawyers often seem to be at or near the center of trouble and,
consequently, are subject to the accusation of being a cause of the
problem and not a vital contributor to its solution. This article will not
deal with the image of the lawyer, tempting subject that it is, but rather
with the responsibilities imposed upon him as a professional "problem-
solver" in a society whose demands often exceed its rewards.
The law is in a state of transition
Clearly, the demands of the practice are heavier today than ever
before. Clients are asking lawyers with increasing frequency to account
for their actions. While the causes for increased client awareness of the
frailty of lawyers have been and will continue to be the subject of wide
discussion and speculation, perhaps some consensus may be reached that
two reasons for that increased awareness and concomitant desire for
accountability are (1) broader coverage of sensational and "political"
trials by all types of recognized communication-with the never-ending
* A word about the title: Sisyphus was a King in Greek mythology who was
condemned to Hades. His task there was to roll a huge stone up a hill. When-
ever Sisyphus stopped for breath, the stone rolled back. His task was thus
never completed.
Partner, Murphy, Huiskamp, Stolper, Brewster and Desmond, Madison, Wis-
consin; University of Wisconsin, B.S. 1950; LL.B. 1955. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Mrs. Anne T. Wadsack in the preparation of
this article. Mrs. Wadsack is currently a clerk of the firm and will become an
Associate this year.
1 Dick: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."
Jack Cade: "Nay, that I mean to do. Is not this a lamentable thing, that of the
skin of an innocent lamb should be made parchment? That parchment, being
scribbled o'er, should undo a man? Some say the bee stings: but I say, 'tis
the bee's wax; for I did but seal once to a thing, and I was never mine own
man since." King Henry, VI, Part II, Act IV, Scene 2.
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accompanying comments on lawyers' techniques and strategy and (2) the
increased general level of education and intellectual awareness of lay-
men. Additional causes for awareness include an emerging public
resentment against anyone claiming professional (or any other) immuni-
ty, the increased complexity of laws, rules and regulations which ought
to lead lawyers at least to some measure of specialization and, lastly, the
gradual demise of the practice of "professional silence" (to protect fel-
low lawyers) in response to the public hue and cry of a "credibility
gap" between what lawyers say and what they do.
Whatever the causes may be, the trend to greater responsibility and
accountability is unmistakable. Lawyers must respond positively in
order to continue to enjoy the respect and confidence of the public.
To be meaningful, our response should be based on an awareness of the
principal areas of our vulnerability. One of our faithful companions,
American Jurisprudence, provides, by way of illustration and not limita-
tion, a listing of those items which may be the areas of our greatest
vulnerability:
1. Non-observance of local statutes.
2. Negligence in initiating and conducting litigation.
3. Appellate matters.
4. Negligent title searches.
5. Negligent preparation of legal instruments.
6. Negligent failure to file papers.
7. Negligent handling of collections.
8. Commingling of funds.
9. Failure to adhere to statutes of limitation (the most common
source of exposure).
10. Acting beyond the scope of delegated authority.
11. Making unauthorized appearances.
12. Fraud.
13. Vicarious liability for actions of associates or assistants.
While the client expects his lawyer to use his "best efforts" in the
preparation and advocacy of his case, the lawyer, regardless of the
theory propounded, has historically been held to have the duty to exer-
cise reasonable care and skill as a member of a learned profession in a
position of confidence and trust.2 Long ago, the United States Supreme
Court cogently stated the lawyer's responsibility:
When a person adopts the legal profession, and assumes to exer-
cise its duties in ,behalf of another for hire, he must be understood
as promising to employ a reasonable degree of care and skill in
the performance of such duties; and if injury results to the client
2 National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880). However, the standard
of care required of a Wisconsin attorney may be somewhat stronger:
If an attorney . . . acts with a proper degree of attention, and with
reasonable care, and to the best of his skill, he will not be responsible
[for injuries which might arise from his actions]. (Emphasis added).
Malone v. Gerth, 100 Wis. 166, 75 N.W. 972 (1898).
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from a want of such a degree of reasonable care and skill, the
lawyer may be held to respond in damages to the extent of the
injury sustained .... [LIawyers do not profess to know all the
law or to be incapable of error or mistake in applying it to the
facts of every case, as even -the most skillful of the profession
would hardly be able to come up to that standard. Unless the
client is injured by the deficiencies of his lawyer, he cannot main-
tain any action for damages; but if he is injured, the true rule is
that the lawyer is liable for the want of such skill, care and
diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employments.
3
Justice Clifford stated the then-classic prerequisite of privity for lia-
bility when he noted that "[p]roof of employment and the want of
reasonable care and skill are prerequisites to the maintenance of the
[malpractice] action." While the duty of the lawyer to his client has
not changed substantially in the years since Ward, the prerequisite of
privity in actions based on negligence in discharging the duty of care
has faced mounting attacks. 4
More and more the action is now premised on the classic concept of
negligence (duty, breach, cause and damage) and is bottomed in
tort rather than contract law.5 The lawyer's position of trust and confi-
dence based upon his superior technical knowledge makes him respon-
sible not only to those with whom he has contracted, but also may make
him responsible to all of those whom he may reasonably expect to be
affected by his professional actions. The lawyer generally has been held,
in the discharge of his professional duty, to the level of proficiency
commonly possessed and exercised by fellow lawyers in his community;
but, since the malpractice suit now increasingly is bottomed in tort, he
may not rest secure in the knowledge that the ordinary tolling of the
applicable statute of limitations establishes a perimeter to his exposure.
An examination of a recent leading case, Heyer v. Flaig,6 will best
illustrate the form and direction of future malpractice actions and hope-
fully provide us with sufficient basis to take appropriate corrective
measures.
An attractive widow with two daughters and a comfortable estate
asked her lawyer to prepare a will with the direction to divide her
estate equally between the daughters. Upon further investigation, the
lawyer learned that she was about to marry a widower with children
of his own. She told the lawyer in order to avoid confusion between the
two families, she and her husband-to-be wanted to arrange their affairs
so as to provide for each child as though the subsequent marriage had
• National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880).
4 See, Welder v. Mercer, - Ark. _., 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970); Malick v.
Migut, - Mich. _, 177 N.W.2d 200 (1970).
See note 8, infra; see also Scandett v. Greenhouse, 244 Wis. 108, 11 N.W.2d
510 (1943).
r 70 Cal.2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969).
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never taken place. Accordingly, the lawyer drafted and had her execute
a will dividing her estate equally between her two girls.
Several yefirs later, the lawyer received a surprising letter from
another lawyer informing him that, upon the death of his client, her
will was voided because it failed to make provision for the widower
the lawyer knew she would marry-a result required by a statute in
effect at the time of drafting. Furthermore, the letter informed the poor
fellow that the new lawyer represented the two daughters and they
intended to sue him for their lost inheritance, among other things.
The lawyer in this case demurred, and while the trial court sus-
tained his demurrer, the California Supreme Court reversed. In doing
so, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until- the death of the testatrix7 and that a lawyer is liable not only for
the direct harm caused by his carelessness, but also for the harm result-
ing to third parties-even those with whom he has not dealt-if they
are in fact injured as a consequence of his actions."
This decision clearly indicates that courts in major populous states
are departing from the contractual concept in malpractice actions be-
cause of the difficulties of proof for the layman (i.e., professional silence
on the question of breach) and the limitation on the measure of dam-
ages.9 The modern trend, therefore, is to hold an attorney liable for
foreseeable injury to a plaintiff such as the beneficiary of a will.10
Likewise, the lawyer who has notice of possible injury to a third party
if he acts on his client's request' may be found liable for damages.
7 While the California court refused to adopt the "postponed accrual" rule
of medical malpractice-that the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the negligence is discovered or discoverable-it did find that a third
party beneficiary, whose cause of action does not accrue until the testator's
death, is not barred by the statute since a separate and distinct duty is owed
him. The breach of that duty is the attorney's failure to correct his error
prior to the testator's death. After the testator's death, the error is irremedi-
able, and the cause of action accrues. 70 Cal. 2d at 232-33. Wisconsin takes
the position that the statute of limitations starts to run when the negligence
and resultant injury occurred. Denzer v. Rouse 48 Wis. 2d 528, 180 N.W2d
521 (1970).8 70 Cal. 2d at 226-27. The Heyer decision reaffirms California's break with
the absolute privity requirement, first announced in Lucas v. Hamm, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961). See: Note, "Liability of Attorney to an In-
tended Beneficiary for Negligent Drafting of a Will," 45 M1ARQ. L. Rxv. 459(1962) discussing the potential implications of Lucas v. Hamm.
9 Note the necessity of proving the three-fold tort requirement of duty, breach
and injury in order to maintain attorney malpractice actions in State v. Goode
- S.D.-_ , 171 N.W.2d 733 (1969), and In re Phelps, Kan. _, 459
P.2d 172 (1969), in which it was held that the duty to serve the client exists
whether or not compensation is requested or received; Pusey v. Reed,-
Del. _ 258 A.2d 460 (1969), which requires a showing that the attorney's
error was the proximate cause of the injury; and Woody v. Mudd, - Md.
_ 265 A.2d 458 (1970) and Brosie v. Stockton, - Ariz. _ 468 P.2d
933 (1970), where error without damage or injury was held not actionable.10 Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969) ; Lucas
v. Harnm, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961).
-Blizzard v. Brown, 152 Wis. 160, 139 N.XV. 737 (1913) ; Hubbard v. McLean,
115 Wis. 9, 90 N.W. 1077 (1902).
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The transition to the tort theory as the basis of professional respon-
sibility and concomitant liability has seen a corresponding rise in the
number of successful actions reported at the appellate level.'2 We sus-
pect it has also triggered the informal and unreported disposition of
many other cases in the interest of justice and equity. Consider these
fact situations and try to imagine their informal disposition:
1. Assume A, your client, and B are in a partnership to sell real
estate. A and B purchase land and plat it but fail to have -their wives
sign the plat before recordation. A retains you to represent the partner-
ship in the sale of lots within the plat. Buyer C executes a standard
offer to purchase for one lot and A accepts. C's attorney, after examina-
tion, insists that the plat is defective because the wives of A and B
failed -to join in the plat and no memo of partnership has been recorded.
You argue that the plat is valid. C then purchases a lot somewhere else.
You commence an action for specific performance. C demurs and is
sustained. A now claims malpractice, alleging negligent failure to detect
and cure the defect in the plat, and asks you to pay damages for his
loss of sale to C.
2. A, your client, receives an offer to purchase some of his real
estate from buyer C. While in C's office, A receives the offer in writing
and also some earnest money. The offer provides that A must make
written acceptance of its terms within four days. At that time you
advise A that he has the deal for sure if he agrees at any time within
the four days. C orally confirms this fact. A leaves the office without
giving a written acceptance. Two days later C telegrams a revocation
of his offer. A claims reliance on your advice about the four-day period
which resulted in a loss of sale and seeks damages from you.
3. A requests that you draft a will containing a testamentary trust
which qualifies for the marital deduction. You fail to include the requi-
site power of appointment. The Internal Revenue disallows the deduc-
tion, resulting in $10,000 additional Federal estate taxes. Beneficiaries
in interest demand reimbursement from you for the $10,000 loss.
4. A requests that you arrange the execution of his will which you
drafted. You permit C, the husband of A's stepdaughter, to be one of
the two witnesses to the will execution. A dies and the will is offered in
probate where it is determined that the will was improperly executed
because C was a witness. The will is voided and A now is intestate. B,
as A's stepdaughter, has no standing, since A died intestate, and loses
12 See the cases collected in Attorney and Client, WEST'S SEVENTH DECENNIAL
DIGEST, 1956-66, vol. 3, (1967). The fact that reported Wisconsin malpractice
cases have not increased in number over the past several decades is probably
not indicative of the national trend. Perhaps Wisconsin attorneys and clients
are more amenable to informal resolution of difficulties than those in other
states, particularly Florida and California.
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A's bequest to her due to her husband's incompetency as a witness for
that one bequest. B seeks damages from you for loss of her inheritance.
These situations are not extraordinary and could occur at any time
in a busy law office to a busy lawyer. The consequences of any of the
situations would not be pleasant to the lawyer involved.
Coping with the law in transition is a Jason's quest
We do not intend to create the impression that we mourn the appar-
ent demise of the all-knowing and untouchable "counsellor." If that
were ever the case, it certainly is not an impression that we or society
should perpetuate. However, there is significant difference between
convincing clients that we lawyers are human and not perfect,' 3 and
allowing the creation of a new image-that the lawyer is an easy mark
for litigation.
The increase in threatened and litigated malpractice actions demon-
strates that we face an increasing challenge of matching our claims with
predicted results and that we take great pains through conferences,
correspondence and file memos -to communicate the risks and uncertain-
ties in attaining such results. In plain terms, we should be brave mice
and bell our own cat! The lawyer who does this limits his exposure to
subsequent litigation by the angry or disappointed client when the
results do not meet the expectations.
We mentioned earlier the demands of the law. One of those demands
is an awareness of the areas of exposure which may already lie ticking
away in inactive files or crouched and waiting in the next appointment.
A system of continuing review-retrospectively and prospectively-will
serve to encourage the practicing lawyer to take steps to avoid or, at the
very least, minimize exposure arising from a "rush" or even incomplete
job.1 4 This kind of review would have saved the lawyer in Heyer not
only the expenses of litigation, but the seriously damaging impact of the
malpractice action upon his professional reputation.'
5
We owe it to ourselves, to our noble profession, and to the public we
serve to be ever vigilant, ever better lawyers. As aptly stated by
Alexander Pope:
A man should never be ashamed to own he has been in the
wrong, which is but saying, in other words, that he is wiser today
than he was yesterday.
3 In Heyer v. Flaig, plaintiff sought not only $50,000 in damages for loss of
inheritance, but also $50,000 in punitive damages.
'1 "No attorney is held to the rule of infallibility," People v. Vasquez, 189
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1959) ; this may be wishful thinking in the years ahead.
14 In Heyer v. Flaig, the court found a breach of duty in the attorney's "failure
to advise the testatrix of the possible undesired consequences if she died
without having changed her will." Id., 230.
19711
